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Abstract: 
Decision-making about spatial projects is very complex. Decisions to develop the Rotterdam harbour are 
being taken in a network of local, regional, national, European and international actors, both public and 
private. These decision-making processes show a lot of complexity and the outcomes are of great 
importance for the development of the harbour. The complexity results from interactions between actors 
connected in different arenas all thinking about the same project. In this paper we use network theory and 
especially the concepts actors and arenas to highlight the complexity of decisions and the connections 
between various separate decisions. We also show the outcomes of the decision making process are a 
result of the various connections that are being made. The spatial project at the core of the paper is a 
harbour expansion project called Maasvlakte II. 
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1. Introduction  
Decision-making in the modern network society is complex. Decision-processes take place in networks of 
actors, which are tied by interdependencies in a society where resources and knowledge is spread among 
a variety of actors (Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997; Castells, 2000). Besides these societal groups 
increasingly try to get involved in decision-making, which also makes the decision-making process more 
complex. The history of the case on which this paper focuses, the expansion of Rotterdam harbour by 
creating additional space (Maasvlakte II) illustrates this complexity very nicely. 
 
After the introduction of the project in 1993 we are now 12 years further and 2013 is seen as the year in 
which the first ships can be handled at the terminals for different types of cargos (Press Release Port of 
Rotterdam, 21-04-05). Until now we have witnessed a very complicated process with many actors 
involved. Despite this the main actors involved thought the decision-making had been concluded 
satisfactory until at the end of 2004 the atmosphere suddenly changed. The Council of State (Raad van 
State) judged negatively on the project-proposals because they felt a lack of research about ecological 
aspects. The juridical procedures to implement the proposals (the so called zoning procedure), which were 
almost ready, and to be presented in parliament were stopped. It is expected that it will take an additional 
one and a half year to execute the restarted zoning-procedure. 
 
The case: the expansion of Rotterdam harbour 
As mentioned above the Maasvlakte II was officially introduced in 1993 as one of the alternatives to deal 
with the shortage of space for the Rotterdam harbour expansion. The Port Authority of Rotterdam (at that 
time a municipal organisation) and the Dutch Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Water 
Management introduced the spatial project and embedded the project in the ROM-Rijnmond agreement
1. 
The involved actors introduced several projects and the Maasvlakte II was one of these projects. The 
actors decided to create a project organisation to coordinate the decision-making process. The Port 
Authority and the provincial part of the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Water Management lead 
this project organisation Maasvlakte II. One of the first recommendations of the project organisation was 
to shift the lead to the Ministry. The reason given for this was that the project is of national interest and 
because the Port Authority and provincial department cannot generate sufficient financial means to realise 
a project like this (Weggeman, 2003)  
 
1  In the period in which the Port Plan 2010 was prepared, the public organisations (national level, provincial and 
local) and some private economic stakeholders organised in the ROM-Rijnmond. This covenant for Spatial Planning 
and Environment was meant to research an integrated framework for a sustainable spatial policy in the Rijnmond 
Area (the area in which the port of Rotterdam is mainly situated). The Maasvlakte II was presented in the covenant 
as one of the projects that could contribute to a sustainable ROM-Rijnmond.   3
With this decision the first round of four rounds in the decision-making process came to an end. In the 
analysis of the case in this paper we focus on the second round (the interactive phase that took place from 
1996 till the end of 1997) and the third round (from 1998- till mid 2001 somewhere in 2002). We describe 
the fourth round with the decision of the Council of State as a postscript but do take this round along in 
the analysis at the end (for the concepts of rounds in decision-making see section 2). The second and third 
round are however very interesting because they both show an attempt to cope with complexity in the 
decision-making 
 
Outline of this paper: a network perspective on complexity 
In this paper we focus on the complexity of decision-making using a network perspective to describe and 
analyse that complexity (see Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004). The question we tackle in this paper is: “how can 
we analyse complexity from a network perspective and how can we explain the outcomes of the decision-
making process on the expansion of Rotterdam harbour from this perspective”. So we have a theoretical 
aspiration and an empirical aspiration. In section 2 we first outline our theoretical perspective and show 
how complex decision-making can be analysed using concepts like networks, games, decisions and 
arenas. With these concepts we analyse the decision-making process in the two rounds, which are called 
the VERM and PMR round (section 3 and 4).  In the analysis we focus on the intertwinement of different 
decisions, arenas and networks to analyse the character of decision-making and its complexity. We also 
show how decision-making receives its dynamics by the connection and disconnections of various 
decisions and arenas. And we analyse how decision-making proceeds and stagnates because of different 
connections and how these connections are being managed (section 5). We end with some conclusions 
about how to deal with the complexity in decision-making (section 6). 
 
2. A network perspective on complexity 
We use the network perspective to conceptualise complexity and analyze the case. The network 
perspective assumes that policy is developed and implemented in networks of organizations 
(Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997; Klijn/Koppenjan, 2000). These policy networks can be defined as 
“changing patterns of social relationships between interdependent actors which take shape around policy 
problems and/or clusters of resources and that are formed, maintained and changed by an ecology of 
games”. One could also say that these networks are complex systems of organisations. 
 
Networks come into being and remain in existence because actors are dependent on each other (Aldrich, 
1979; Negandhi, 1975; Milward/Wamsley, 1985). Actors cannot achieve their objectives without resources, and other actors possess these. Networks are thus characterized by a limited substitutability of 
resources, which ensures that sustainable social relations between actors are created.  Essential for a good 
understanding of a case like the expansion of the Maasvlakte II is that the interactions around these 
decisions, which we call a game, not only take place within networks of organisations but that separate 
decisions are often situated in separate arenas. These arenas can be situated in one network but sometimes 
more arenas in different networks are involved which enhances complexity considerably. We elaborate on 
the theoretical perspective and the notion of complexity in policy interactions below.  
 
Arenas and Game: the setting for interaction 
The game of problem solving, in this case the decision on Maasvlakte II, takes place in and between 
arenas. The actors present their strategies in one of more arenas. The arena is the place or field where 
actors meet and play their game. It is the place where a specific group of actors make choices on the basis 
of their perceptions of problems and solutions (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972). The evolution and 
outcomes of decision-making processes in policy networks is determined to a large degree by the mix of 
strategies brought into the arena and the interactions between arenas.  An arena consist of a set of actors, a 
choice situation and some more or less well designed organisational arrangements (Koppenjan/Klijn, 
2004) 
 
Figure 1 presents the policy game as a mix of actors’ strategies in an arena that form a game type at a 
given moment (t1). In the course of time, the game type may change: after a while (t2) actors may have 
coordinated their strategies. And then later (t3), changed strategies may again result in a new game type. 
 







t2 t1  
Adapted from Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004  
 
  4Complexity: strategic actions of players in multiple arenas 
Policy games are complex not only because there are many players making unpredictable strategic 
choices, but also because they are often simultaneously involved in more than one arena. This is because 
most problems have different dimensions and thus touch upon different types of policies and actors. For 
instance, in decision making on harbour expansion, issues such as transport, economy, employment, 
planning and zoning, noise, safety, and so forth, play a role. As a consequence, decisions about the future 
of the harbour are made in the context of various types of policies in various arenas and at various 
government levels. As a result, the policy game acquires a highly fragmented character with decisions 
being made in different arenas at different levels and times. Figure 2 gives an image of that situation.  
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Adapted from Koppenjan/Klijn 2004 
 
More complexity: the relation to other games and networks 
The complexity of policy games is also enhanced because games are not played in a vacuum, but amidst 
other games. Within an arena, actors can play more than one game. As a consequence these games 
influence one another. A loss in one game can be compensated by a gain in the other, or vice-versa. And 
different arenas play games to try to couple the arena internal problem solving with problem solving 
processes in other arenas. Policy games thus can influence each other. Through couplings new trade-offs 
can be realized between games. Because of this, it is conceivable that in the one game, support for 
unpopular measures is created because there is compensation in another game. Furthermore, coupling of 
  5games may have a mitigating effect upon conflicts and strategies that actors use. The costs for strategic 
misbehaviour in one game will become due in another (Allison, 1971). Policy games will be even more 
complicated if they occur in arenas that are situated in different networks. Figure 3 presents a graphic 
representation of this notion. 










Adapted from Klijn en Koppenjan, 2004 
 
Not only is it difficult to connect the various interactions, but it is also likely that different networks are 
characterized by different rules. This means that in arenas that are composed of actors and interaction 
activated from different networks, different sets of rules are used. This again increases complexity of the 
game. 
 
Outcomes of policy games: result of many interactions 
The evolution of policy games is not that of a linear process where a problem is solved on the basis of 
authoritative ex ante problem formulations or objectives. Policy games develop through a series of 
successive decisions about the nature and content of a problem, about solutions and about how these 
matters are being decided. Just as there is no central decision maker, there is no central decision. The 
policy game looks more like a sports match played in a number of rounds (Radford, 1977; Teisman, 
1992). A round opens with an initiative or policy intention of one of the parties that serves as ‘trigger’ to 
the others.  What follows is that in an initially unclear or conflictual situation, parties discuss with each 
other and negotiate about what is to be done (March and Olsen, 1976). Then, through a series of steps, 
parties will search for mutual adaptation or joint solutions.  
  6Impasses and breakthroughs 
This process is not without problems. Impasses are in the way of achieving satisfactory solutions for all 
parties. Impasses may emerge because actors are unwilling to invest in the process (stagnation) or 
because there is a conflict where some use their veto power (blockage). Impasses may eventually lead to 
terminating the policy discussion, but may also result in a breakthrough. Breakthroughs and can come 
about by crucial decisions that reformulate the problem conciliate opposing solutions or change the group 
of those involved. Each round ends with a ‘crucial decision’, a decision that offers a solution for the 
question that is central in the particular policy round. The content of such a solution is often quite 
unexpected: it is frequently based in a redefinition of the original problem and a transposition of earlier 
positions and objectives, so that the scope for solution is changed or enlarged. The game then assumes an 
unexpected direction. A crucial decision heralds a new round or leads to a restart of earlier rounds. Thus, 
a ‘whole new ball game’ emerges with stakes, perceptions and strategies. Figure 2.5 visualizes a policy 
game through different rounds. The vertical axis provides the development of the content of plans, the 
horizontal axis the development over time. The direction of the arrows indicates the degree to which the 
process zigzags (substantively) and evolves by fits and starts (in terms of time). The total policy game is 
composed of different games between actors in the arena, between the arenas and between the rounds. In 
all these games and sub games impasses and breakthroughs can occur. 
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Adapted from Klijn ea. 2000 
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Complexity and explanations for policy processes 
From a network perspective complexity is an inherent character of problem solving and decision-making 
processes. Complexity is the result of: 
•  Various actors with different perceptions which each act strategically (and thus can not be 
predicted accurately, although knowledge of their position and perceptions gives some idea of the 
range of their strategies 
•  The interactions of different strategies of different actors within arenas 
•  The interactions of various decisions made in different arenas within a policy round 
•  The interactions of various decisions made in different arenas between policy rounds 
•  The fact that interactions may occur in different arenas, which belong to different networks, 
create the possibilities that different rules will be used and taken for granted by involved actors. 
 
Policy processes are dynamic complex interaction processes, which sometimes produce unexpected 
results like we can see in the introduction. Network theory provides a variety of explanations for reaching 
successful outcomes (see Koppenjan/Klijn 2004). The most important are: 
•  Achieving interesting solutions that satisfy the various values at stake   
•  Coupling of interactions of actors and arenas 
•  Shared institutional structures (like network rules) 
•  Systematic management efforts 
 
In this paper we focus specifically on three explanations for success of outcomes in decision-making. 
These three are: 
•  The actor dynamics and positions,  
•  The activated arenas and flow of the decision-making process  
•  The achieved couplings and managerial activities. 
 
With successful outcomes we mean outcomes that: 
•  Generate support among many involved actors and of which actors are satisfied 
•  Outcomes that are clearly developed in terms of content (this can be judged from the fact that 
new ideas have been developed, by the fact that plans meet earlier criticism etc.) 
•  Outcomes which have been realised trough open processes where cost are not transferred to other 
actors or networks  
   9
3. The VERM-Round (1997-1998): actors, arenas and interactions  
In April 1996 the Cabinet decides to shift the responsibility for the project (Maasvlakte II) to the Ministry 
of Public Works, Transport and Water Management. The first action undertaken by the new ministerial 
project organisation is to start the VERM (Exploration Spatial Need For Mainport Rotterdam). The 
VERM is meant to discuss the necessity and urgency of the expansion of the harbour area. The crucial 




At first a project team was created for the organisation of the interactive decision-making process or 
open-plan process. This project organisation consisted of civil servants from four departments (Public 
Works, Transport and Water Management; Economic Affairs; Agriculture, Natural Resources and 
Fisheries; Public Housing and Zoning). Besides the project team various groups of actors can be 
distinguished in the open plan process  (Videler, 1997 / De Vries, 1997). The main actors present in the 
VERM are presented in table 1. The degree of participation of the actors is indicated as well and is meant 
to figure as input for the description of several arenas below.  
 
Table 1: Actors in the VERM-Round 
Actors Characterisation  Moments  of  participation 
Citizens Individual  citizens  (generally 
interested) 
Especially in the workshops and 
the round table meetings (also the 
surveys) 
Interest groups (economic)  Nationally  organised  economic 
interest groups (labour unions, 
employers organisations, 
Association of Dutch chemical 
industry) 
Especially in sounding board 
group, also in national 
presentation, the workshops 
Interest groups (environmental)  National  and  regional 
environmental groups (Society 
for Nature and Environment, 
World Nature Fund etc.) 
Especially in sounding board 
group. Modest participation in 
workshops, round table groups 
Regional administrators  Mayors/Aldermen  of 
municipalities and counties 
involved; representatives and 
directors of harbour companies 
Dominant in consultant 
discussion, amply represented in 
round table meetings, more 






Especially in expert meetings. 
                                                 
2 Zoning procedure is a free translation of the Dutch term PKB (Planologische Kernbeslissing or Spatial Core 
Decision in English). The PKB is a zoning document (made in several steps) on which spatial decisions are based an 
find their legal basis 
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expertise in relevant fields 
(regional economics, public 
administration environment etc.) 
Less intensive in sounding board 
groups, workshops 
National administrators  Ministers  Minimal involvement  
Departments (units and people 
not in VERM) 
Public Housing and Zoning; 
Public Works, Transport and 
Water Management, Finance; 
Economic Affairs 
Minimal involvement, but active 
in interactions around VERM 
Parliament  Political parties (national level) Very  limited  participation   
Adapted from Klijn, 2003  
 
Given the participation of various actors and the organisation of the VERM process, we can conclude that 
there were really two groups of arenas interacting in two different games. On the one hand, there was the 
policy game around VERM itself, the interactive process in which various actors interacted concerning 
the question whether there was lack of space in Rotterdam harbour and how that could be solved. This 
was done in two closely related arenas and a loosely linked arena: a discussion arena with workshops and 
panels which were very open for all actors (especially individual citizens); an expert arena parallel to the 
first and dominated by expert meetings and research; and a condition arena where the conditions of the 
process organisation of participation) were discussed. The project group VERM dominated the first two 
arenas, which as network manager, linked decisions and arenas. The third, more loosely linked arena was 
more a regular contact between project group and departments in which national interest groups also 
participated. In these three arenas almost all of the actual interaction of the various actors in the VERM 
project  took place. For that reason they are called the central arenas
3. 
 
In addition to the arenas in which the VERM game took place, there were two important arenas for 
decision making in the VERM process. First, there was the departmental arena, the initial decision arena, 
in which the results of the VERM discussion were transformed into an initial decision (the cabinet 
decision was prepared in this arena before it went to Parliament). The Department of Public Works, 
Transport and Water Management was the most important actor in this arena, but actors from other 
departments were involved as well. Second, there was a political arena for the political decision about the 
subsequent course of action. The parliament and the ministers played a prominent role with the 
departments in the background (see Table 2 for the most important arenas). In these two peripheral arenas 
the interactions took place after the VERM process had been finished. 
                                                 
3 The concepts central and peripheral thus refer to the density of interactions in the game   11
 
Table 2: Arenas in VERM 
Arena Central  actors  Organisation  and 
linkages of interactions 
in arena 
Task/activities 
Central  arenas     






round table meetings, 
workshops and 
sounding board groups 
Linkages: by project 
group VERM 
Discussion about nature 
of problem, types of 
solutions, interests etc. 
2. Expert arena  Scholars,  national 




board groups and 
research (CPB) 
Linkages: by project 
group VERM 













initiative of project 
group 
Discussion about 
VERM design, about 
types of product, about 
participation 
Peripheral arenas     




Fisheries and Public 
Works, Transport and 
Water Management), 





Public Works, Transport 
and Water Management 
Preparing initial 








Political decision and its 
preparation (by cabinet) 
 Adapted from: Klijn 2003 
  
Interactions in and between central arenas;  
There are varying degrees of intensity in interactions in and between the arenas. At first the interactions in 
the condition arena can be considered a meta-game for the actual interactive process. At the beginning 
(mid 1997) it appeared that there was limited support from the civil service for the open plan process. The 
Maasvlakte II project group continued to co-exist with the VERM project group and civil servants from 
various departments continued to work on the development of the Maasvlakte II. This meant that while 
they continued to work on policy solutions for the shortage of space in Rotterdam, they were also   12
discussing the nature and urgency of that problem and alternative solutions.  
 
There were also those within the Ministries who objected to the VERM discussion. They questioned a 
procedure that involved so many citizens. They preferred a greater role for interest groups during the 
discussion. At a meeting with the top civil servants of the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Water 
Management in September 1997, the question of whether the real problems had emerged was explicitly 
raised. “Societal talk is not yet societal support” was the argument. Also, it was made clear that the 
minister and members of Parliament could not join in the discussion because - it was argued - they had 
their own responsibilities. This also meant that the project decision might differ from the outcome of the 
discussion. Thus the top civil servants of the Ministry maintained the right to determine the project 
decision for itself; they refused to be bound by decisions in the interactive arenas in any way. This point 
of view was repeated in subsequent discussions between project group VERM and the top civil servants 
of various Ministries. The open entry rules in the interaction arena conflicted with the closed nature of the 
arenas outside the VERM discussion. Formally the VERM interaction arenas are not a threat to the 
position and authority rules of Ministries and politicians because in the interactive arenas no final 
decisions can be made. The results of the interactions in these arenas have only the status of advice and 
information. In practice they are however a threat because it is not easy for politicians and civil servants 
to neglect the results of the interactive phases in which much time and energy has been invested. It is 
precisely to take away this pressure and modify the expectations that politicians and civil servants stress 
their own responsibilities at the beginning.  
 
Interest groups also tried to influence the utility and necessity discussion during this meta-game. The 
environmental organisations were discontent with the design of the discussions in the workshops and the 
round table meetings. They withdrew because they felt that the real discussion about utility and necessity 
had not taken place (we will show this in the fourth paragraph). Furthermore, they would have liked for 
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Committee to be involved for the substantive monitoring of 
the environmental objective and the support for it. Both the ministers of Traffic and Water Management 
and the monitoring commission had signalled the VERM project group that it was important for the 
environmental organisations to stay involved. A meeting resulted in the decision to ask the EIA 
Committee for advice and the formation of an extra sounding board group. The environmental 
organisations would have the opportunity to comment on the structural policy of the cabinet 
(strengthening the mainports of Rotterdam and Schiphol).    13
Toward the crucial decision: interactions outside the central arenas 
On the basis of the findings from the open plan process, the project group advised the cabinet to construct 
a smaller Maasvlakte than initially proposed by the project group Maasvlakte II. For the time being, the 
Maasvlakte II should be about 500 ha. ‘dry area’ (that is without harbour facilities) or 1000 ha. with a 
direct link to water. Also, a new nature area of about 750 ha should be developed. The project group thus 
concluded that smart ‘expansion solutions’ were almost as expensive as the construction of a new area of 
some 2000 ha. so the choice for a new area that respects nature values was obvious. After the discussion 
in the open plan process, the preparation for the project decision was returned to the departments. The 
final project decision conveyed the cabinet’s point of view that an economic growth of 3% was necessary 
in order to guarantee sufficient growth of employment, and a well functioning Rotterdam port was 
important for that goal. According to the cabinet, research supported the idea that there was a lack of 
space for the mainport. It proposed the initiation of a zoning procedure that would focus on land creation 
of about 1000 ha. of contiguous harbour and industry area with its own access to the sea. The possibility 
for the alternative of 500 ha. dry area would also have to be investigated, and future expansion should be 
possible. Furthermore, this procedure should investigate how the 750 ha. of nature and recreation area 
could be realised.  
 
In December 1997 the Parliament discussed the proposal to initiate the zoning procedure. The discussion 
was dominated by the question whether there was enough material to start this procedure the minister 
indicated that she assumed a lack of space and that expansion was necessary, but that the zoning 
procedure may show otherwise. After discussion, all motions to delay the zoning procedure were rejected. 
Only one motion of the social democratic party, the PvdA (social democrats), was accepted. This motion 
indicated that the objectives of developing the mainport and improving liveability were equal and that the 
various alternatives with respect to such issues (i.e. required acreage, the balance between private and 
public investments, the transport and environmental actions, and the nature conservation area) were to be 
worked out simultaneously. The cabinet parties of D’66 (liberal democrats) and PvdA supported the 
motion based primarily on a concern about the environmental component in the decision-making. The 
cabinet party VVD (conservative liberals) supported the motion because it did not want to be surprised at 
a later stage with alternatives, which were not discussed earlier - as happened with the high-speed train. 
The decision to start the zoning procedure is the crucial decision that marks the end of the VERM-Round.  
We will elaborate on the dynamics in the zoning procedure in the next paragraph. 
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4 The PMR-Round (1998-2001): actors, arenas and interactions 
On the 14
th of July (1997) the Project Mainport Rotterdam was started. PMR got two main tasks, research 
the alternatives for expansion and research and describe the influences on the quality in the surrounding 
living environment. PMR was organised by the different governmental layers, the following public 
organizations were incorporated; The ministries of Public Works, Transport and Water Management; 
Living, Spatial Planning and Environment; Economic Affairs; Agriculture, Natural Resources and 
Fisheries; and Finance. The province of South-Holland, municipality of Rotterdam and the city-region of 
Rotterdam were incorporated in the project organisation as well. This project organisation got the 
responsibility for the preparation of the zoning procedure that started at the end of 1997 (December 
1997/January 1998).   
 
Besides all these public actors, many others were participating in this part of the policy game (see table 
3).  Societal groups like the Society for Nature and Environment, firms and intermediaries participated in 
the Consultation Non-Public Actors (ONR)
4. Some representatives of the PMR joined the ONR regularly 
to relate the discussion made in the ONR to the public arena, which is called BOM
5 (Public Consultation 
Mainports). The PMR project organisation actors were mostly represented in the BOM. The BOM 
focused on the Public Consultation whereas the PMR was meant to coordinate between the arenas. In 
other words the PMR is the framework in which the interactions between the different arenas were 
structured. This is why we have called this Round the PMR-Round. This does not mean that the PMR 
project organisation stopped when this Round ended, but PMR offers a goods characterisation for the 
interactions during this Round.  
 
The BOM and ONR are the most central arenas in the PMR. Both arenas were connected by the 
organisational arrangement called the Top Council
6 (Top Beraad). The Vision and Heart group also 
influenced the ONR and is described as arena in which some actors were actively participating. This short 
introduction is meant to clarify the different terms that will be used in the following table.  
 
4 Consultation Non Public Actors  will be named ONR (Overleg Niet Rijkspartijen in Dutch) in the following of this 
paper. The ONR is the forum were the non-public actors met each other and discussed about the alternatives of port 
expansion and tried to made some advices heard within the departments and the ministers. The ONR was formalised 
in 2000 
5 Public Consultation Mainports will be named BOM (Bestuurlijk Overleg Mainports) in the following of this paper. 
The BOM is the forum in which the public actors met each other and discussed about the alternatives of the harbour 
expansion. The were directly linked to the departments and ministers.   
6 The Top Council (Top Beraad in Dutch), was an organisational arrangement, which was directly linked to the 
minister of Water management, Transport and Public Works. In the early years of this round, only the BOM was 
directly linked as well, later on the ONR was incorporated as well.   15
Table 3 Actors in the PMR Round 
Actors  Characterisation  Moments of participation  
Interest groups (economic)  Nationally  organised  economic 
interest groups (labour unions, 
employers organisations, 
Association of Dutch chemical 
industry) 
Especially in intern coordination 
and partly in the regular sessions 
of ONR.  
Interest groups (environmental)  National  and  regional 
environment groups (Society for 
Nature and Environment, 
Consept etc.) Representatives of 
Port Authority 
Especially in ONR and partly in 
Vision and Heart. Discussion 
about incorporation of 
environmental values 
Regional administrators  Mayors/Aldermen  of 
municipalities and provinces 
involved; and the association of 
Water Boards 
Especially in Public Consultation 
Mainports (BOM) and some 
separately in Vision and Heart    
Project coordinators    Project  organisation  PMR  and 
individuals (Hans Alders/Roel in 
‘t Veld) 
Active in and between different 
structures, like in ONR, between 





Minimal involvement, until latter 
stages of PMR Round 
Mixed  interest  groups  Like the Automobile Drivers 
Association, intermediaries  
Incorporated in ONR, 
representing mixed values. 
Departments    Public Housing and Zoning; 
Traffic and water Management, 
Finance; Economic Affairs 
Involvement in Public 
Consultation Mainports and 
informing the ministers 
Parliament  Political parties (national level)  Very limited participation, in 
approval of zoning procedure 
adapted from Weggeman, 2003.  
 
These “PMR-actors” functioned in five different arenas playing in two distinct games. On the one hand 
there was the policy game in which the alternatives for harbour expansion were discussed. This was done 
in two closely related arenas. The ONR-arena was characterised by regular meetings in which the 
consequences of the different alternatives for expansion were discussed. Then there was the BOM arena 
composed of the ministries, province and municipality. Although the conditions of the process were 
discussed here, the focus was on discussion of the alternatives as well.   
 
Besides this an arena called Vision and Heart (Visie en Durf) developed parallel to the ONR. Three 
environmental pressure groups worked together with the municipality of Rotterdam to discuss the 
environmental compensation measures developed in the port expansion plans. This is a closely coupled 
arena as well. 
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The fourth and the fifth arena were loosely coupled. The fourth arena is called the private-consultation 
arena. Parallel to the discussion of the alternatives a group of private firms was consulted to discuss 
possibilities for Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) for the realisation of the alternatives. It is particularly 
striking that the discussion about the PPP focused on the realisation of the Maasvlakte II. This indicates 
the ongoing dominance of this alternative in the discussion. 
 
The fifth was a political arena for the political decision about the subsequent course of action. The 
parliament and the ministers played a prominent role in the latter stages of this round and afterwards, but 
were really absent in the discussion. The five arenas are indicated in table 4. In  and between these arenas 
the transformation of the discussion towards an decision took place.  
 
Table 4: Arenas in the PMR Round 
Arena Central  actors  Organisation  and 
linkages of interactions 
in arena 
Task/activities 
Central  arenas     
1. ONR 
arena (formalis
















Linkages: by BOM  




Peripheral  arenas     
3. Vision  and 
Heart 
 
Interest Groups (mainly 
environmental) 
organized to discuss 
environmental aspects 









Discussion about how to 
incorporate 
environmental aspects 
in expansion of harbour 
4.    PPP  Arena  Firms and Ministry of 
Public Works, Transport 
and Water Management 
Organisation: 
Some meetings 





5.   Political arena 
 
Parliament, cabinet, 




Political decision and 
preparation (by cabinet) 
Adapted from Weggeman, 2003. 
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Interactions in and between the central arenas 
There are varying degrees of intensity in interaction in and between the arenas. At first the linkages within 
the ONR-arena were loosely (from 1998 on). Only when the arena got a more prominent position (after 
formalisation in 2000) in the discussion with the public organizations the organisation got relatively more 
related. The BOM arena was relatively well organised because it was linked very strongly to the actors in 
the project organisation.  
 
The dichotomy between the economic and environmental stakes is at the heart of the discussion about the 
open plan process and of an ongoing character. The environmental groups express their feelings of 
misrepresentation regularly and the tension between economic and environmental interests dominates the 
decision-making. This tension seems to be captured by the formalisation of the ONR at the beginning of 
2000. The agreement is quite unique, in the sense that it is the first time environmental interest groups 
receive such a strong position in decision-making, and offers the potentials for balancing the economic 
and environmental stakes. But soon after the start of the ONR the same tension becomes actual again. The 
environmental stakeholders want to leave the ONR because the feel neglected. Instead of joint fact-
finding the environmental groups feel like they can only react on the facts. The environmental groups are 
not happy with the communication as well and indicate that their advices do not reach the minister at all 
(Weggeman, 2003, Doe, 2005
7).  
 
The civil servants working and thinking together in the BOM were rather hesitant of the open plan 
process again. They went on with the preparation of the plans for the Maasvlakte II and this led in turn to 
the resistance of the ONR. They wanted a joint decision-making process about the choice of one of the 
alternatives for the expansion of the Rotterdam harbour.  
 
Under the lead of a mediator Hans Alders the stakeholders were brought on talking terms again. The main 
action was the evaluation of the ONR. The evaluation resulted in an advice to the minister in which 
Alders indicated that a Top Council could be a solution for the negative feelings of the different 
stakeholders. This Top Council is composed of representatives of big interest groups (ONR and BOM). 
The environmental stakeholders remained pretty negative about the chances. They wanted full 
participation in the dialogue about the options for creating additional space for port activities. The 
document PMR on Course (Koers) at the end op 1999 feeded the negative feelings again, because the 
 
7 Doe, 2005, this source is  an interview with the project leader of the Second Maasvlakte within the Harbour 
Authority in Rotterdam.   18
option of expanding the port in the South Western part of Holland is described as not possible. The 
environmental stakeholders refused to sign the process covenant. The environmental groups even leave 
the ONR again. The stakeholders directly reacted to a letter in the Dutch paper (NRC) in which the 
scientific board of the PMR indicated there no justified reason why the third option is seen as impossible 
to realise.  
 
An advisor In ‘t Veld is approached to resolve the impasse. He indicated trust should be rewon to bring 
the stakeholders closer again. The minister asked Alders again to mediate, he advised to come together. 
Finally there is agreement on the (formalised) ONR new style in which the ONR can play a more active 
role and advise the minister more directly. This advice is the result of a process in which joint fact-finding 
is placed more centrally. The ONR was placed more centrally besides the BOM in the Top Council and 
has a new direct link and consultation to the minister of Public Works, Transport and Water Management.  
 
Interactions in the peripheral arena’s 
Some of the actors did not actively participate in the first policy game. At first those actors that were 
disappointed about the openness of the plan process. Some environmental interest groups decided to leave 
the discussion arena, because they felt, their stakes were not represented strongly in the discussion. These 
stakeholders finally returned partly in the ONR, after the ONR got a more central role in the interaction 
process in the beginning of 2000. In the meanwhile (the end of 1999) the municipality of Rotterdam 
invited three environmental interest groups (Consept, Natuurmonumenten and the Society for Nature and 
Environment to discuss the incorporation of the environmental stakes (the 750 ha compensation). This 
arena, called Vision and Heart, composed of the actors presented above is advancing parallel the ONR. In 
June 2000 the actors come with an advice that is called Vision and Heart. This arena was known by the 
actors in the ONR and influenced the outcomes of the ONR discussion indirectly. Only the publication of 
the advice some weeks before the official advice of the ONR created some tensions. But these have not 
had the potential diverging influence on the stakeholders in the ONR. We have decided to call this a 
peripheral arena, because the actors could only reach the final deciders via the ONR. 
 
The second peripheral arena was loosely coupled and not participating actively. This is the initiative to 
explore the possibilities for private contribution to the financing of the project. This economic arena was 
founded to search for financing options for the Maasvlakte II. This arena represented the economic stake 
and expected the Maasvlakte II to be realised. In other words, they were already preparing with some 
public organizations the execution of the project. This indicates that the doubts of the environmental   19
interest groups about the real choice between the alternatives can be seen as justified (BOM, 1999 
Marktconsultatiedocument). This arena was linked to the BOM, but could not reach many results in 1999 
and 2000. 
 
The political arena was relatively absent in this round, only the minister was regularly informed by the 
Top Council and project organisation and got advices from the BOM and ONR arena, but was not 
actively participating in this Round. The same goes for the parliament, which only judged the zoning 
procedure after completion. 
 
Towards the crucial decision in the political arena 
The crucial decision taken in this round was the choice for the Maasvlakte II as the solution for the Lack 
of Space for the expansion of the Port of Rotterdam. The minister and the parliament finally made this 
decision. The preparations of the zoning procedure were made in consultation of ONR and BOM. Around 
the crucial decision the linkages between the political arena and the ONR-arena were intensified in the 
Top Council. The crucial decision was laid down in the zoning procedure document part 1, which was 
sent to the parliament on the 11
th of July 2001. In this document the contents of the plan were describe.  
 
5. Complexity in expanding Rotterdam Harbour: outcomes, arenas and actors 
In this paragraph we will look at the dynamics and complexity of the decision making process about the 
expansion of the Rotterdam Harbour. We focus on the two important rounds of the decision-making 
process that have been analysed more in detail in the previous sections: The VERM and PMR-Round. We 
first compare the achieved outcomes in each of these two rounds and then try to find explanations for the 
differences 
 
Outcomes of the VERM and PMR round 
If we compare the achieved outcomes of the two most important decision-making rounds in the game 
around the expansion of the Rotterdam Harbour we see some striking differences. In general the 
evaluation of the outcomes of the PMR round is more positive compared to the evaluation of the VERM 
round. The number of actors that is satisfied with the decision is higher in PMR than in VERM. Although 
the VERM process in the core (the interactive process) is very open, this openness of the process is not 
present in the last stage of the VERM where the decision is being prepared for Parliament. The PMR 
process is mainly open for well-organised interest groups but less so for individual citizens.   20
One can say that in the PMR round a real intertwinement of goals is achieved (Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004): 
the achieved solutions are inclusive in the sense that they satisfy various values at stake and are 
reasonable enriched and actors are satisfied while in the VERM process no real enrichment is achieved 
and only a part of the actors is satisfied. An overview of the evaluation of the outcomes can be found in 
table 5 (the dimensions are conducted from the theory in second paragraph).  
 
Table 5: outcomes in the VERM en PMR round 
Dimension VERM  PMR 
Satisfaction 
of actors 
(+/-, -) Satisfaction rather low with 
environmental groups, and individual 
citizens, reasonable with economic interest 
groups, mixed feelings in parliament, 
reasonable satisfaction with departments 
(+) In general relatively high satisfaction 
with all actors that have been present in 
the process (environmental and economic 
interest groups, public actors) Very 
satisfied parliament 
Enrichment  (+/-,-)Limited enrichment. Much 
information was only available at the end 
of the process. The proposal at the end did 
not differ much from the beginning of the 
process and the argumentation did not 
always refer to the findings of the process 
(or sometimes even conflicts with it) 
(+, +/-) Some interesting ideas to combine 
economic development with 
environmental values (compensation). Not 
necessarily new ideas but making the 




(+/_)The VERM process itself was very 
open and with participation of a wide 
variety of actors, the decision-making after 
the organised VERM process within the 
department was however rather closed 
(+/-, +) Limited open process (mainly 
accessible to organised interest groups but 
not for individual citizens or less well 
organized interest groups) 
Conclusion  (+/-, -): many involvement of actors but a 
lot of dissatisfaction and limited 
enrichment 
+ Reasonable involvement, many 
satisfaction with actors a good enrichment 
 
An interesting question is how we can explain the differences in outcomes of the two rounds. We search 
for the answers by paying attention to actor dynamics and positions, the activating and deactivating of 
arenas and the management efforts as we explained in section 2.  
 
Actor dynamics and positions in the VERM and PMR rounds 
If we look at the actor analysis of the two rounds we find only a limited number of differences in the 
actors and involvement in the two decision rounds. Most of the actors involved in one round are also 
involved in the other round. The main difference is the strong involvement of individual citizens and not 
well-organised interests groups in the VERM (due to the interactive character of the process) that are 
largely absent in the PMR-Round. In the PMR-Round more intermediary actors were involved. 
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There is however difference in the way non-public actors (mainly societal interest groups) were tied to the 
decision-making process. In The PMR-Round the influence of the non-governmental actors was more 
secured than in the VERM-Round. Or to phrase it differently: the level of participation was more intense 
(See Edelenbos/Klijn, forthcoming). This enables a process that was more intense and achieved positions 
of actors that were more equal than in the VERM process. This certainly created a stronger 
interdependency between the actors and a need to combine ideas and develop solutions that satisfied 
various actors (Weggeman, 2003). This cannot be seen apart from the presence of some intermediary 
actors. It seems that the PMR-Round was better designed for interaction. 
 
The flow of decision-making: activating and deactivating arenas  
After the round in which the project was initiated, the decision-making process expanded strongly in the 
VERM-Round, where many actors entered the game and more different arenas were created and/or 
activated. One could say that in the second round the game expanded enormously compared to the first 
initial round. As can be observed from the analytical description of the VERM- and PMR-Round every 
round has its activated arenas. And each arena has its own temporarily constructed organisational 
arrangements. So just as the VERM-Round has its special organisational arrangements (organised by the 
project bureau VERM) the PMR-Round (as The Top Council) has its arrangements.  
 
The arenas interacting in both Rounds are like the actors relatively similar. The only difference that the 
discussion of the VERM took place in two separate arenas, where in the PMR, the ONR and BOM arena 
came together in the Top Council. It is striking that the discussion arena in the VERM had relatively little 
influence on the crucial decision whereas the ONR, BOM and Vision and Heart arena in the PMR 
influenced the political arena in direct (advising minister) (BOM/ONR) and indirect ways (advising 
minister via ONR). So we can say the active discussion arena of the VERM-Round split up in two of even 
three arenas in the PMR. The project organisation (condition arena in VERM) changed into an 
intermediary mitigating actor binding the three other arenas. The political arena only changed internally 
and was as active in both Rounds, but more influenced in the PMR-Round. The expert and initiating 
arenas of the VERM were incorporated more or less in the other arenas in the PMR. These switches of 
arenas indicate the dynamic character of the policy game. In the first round only the departments and the 
port authority were active as initiators. During the VERM and PMR Round arenas got active and de-
activated again, the dynamics were high but the linkages between the arenas grew especially in the PMR-
Round. After the PMR-Round, the policy game lost its dynamics largely. The formal juridical zoning 
procedure started and the ONR was only loosely coupled.  Managing the connections: a multitask job 
As we compare the two rounds we can observe in the first place that the connections between the different 
arenas and decisions were connected better to each other in the PMR phase. The political actors (both 
Ministers and members of Parliament) were well connected to the other decisions in the PMR compared 
to the VERM case which showed a rather sharp demarcation between the open interactive phase of the 
round and the departmental and political decision-making afterwards (Klijn 2003).  
 
The job of managing the interactions in the decision-making process is not the job of one actor. In the 
VERM round we can at least find two network managers which take care of managing (part of) the 
interactions: the project group VERM and the ministry of Transport. The last actor only manages the 
procedure of preparing the proposal for the parliament. For the PMR the project organisation PMR is one 
of the managers. This is the only actor, which participated in BOM and ONR and coupled some results. 
The same goes for in ‘t Veld and especially Alders. He managed the process to combine the public wish 
to incorporate the non-public actors in the plan process. In short we can conclude the network 
management activities in the PMR round were more intensive and more aimed at connecting actors and 
arenas than in the VERM round and that we have to find at least partly the explanation for the greater 
success of the PMR round in this network management activity. 
 
Table 6: Network managers and network management activities in VERM and PMR round 
Round Managers  Activities 
VERM  Project bureau VERM (VERM 
arenas) 
Ministry of Transport (for the 
initial decision arena) 




PMR  PMR project bureau 
individuals 
ONR 
PMR project organisation, 
joining discussion in BOM and 
ONR. Managing process between 
non public and public actors 
 
Postscript: After the PMR-Round, unforeseen impasse:  The offering of the first part of the zoning-
procedure to the parliament in July 2001 marked the start of a political process. In this round the cabinet 
proposals were discussed in the parliament and open for public consultation. The discussion on and the 
preparation of the second, third and fourth part took a time (until half 2003). In the meanwhile the Top 
Council was regularly informed and asked for advices, but no real interactions were taking place.  
 
From the 30
th of September 2003 until the 30
th of November organizations and individuals were able to 
object to the concrete decisions laid down in the fourth part of the zoning documents. Twenty-six 
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objections were made by different individuals (farmers, fishers) and organizations (people of Oostvoorne, 
Consept). All these objections were dealt, some were rejected, some approved. After that the Council of 
State made a final decision that they were in doubt of the research done to some environmental aspects 
(like the transport of plankton, gulf streams along the Dutch coast). These doubts made them reject the 
fourth part of the zoning document.  
 
This does not mean the whole process of interaction has to be redone. Only the last part of the zoning 
procedure starts again. The zoning procedure documents have to be changed, according to the guidelines 
of the Council of State and afterwards new objections can be made and the Council of State decides 
again, if the project can be approved or not.  
 
If we analyse the grounds on which the Council of State based its rejection we come to some interesting 
explanations. First that many of the objections came from actors who were largely neglected in the 
process: farmers and fishermen. Second that the objections of the farmers and fishers were related to the 
compensation measures taken in the project. Because of the interaction between the actors and arenas in 
the second and third round the compensation of 750 ha of natural areas was incorporated in the project 
plan on the Second Maasvlakte. This new and second project raised some doubts with some fishermen 
and especially the farmers and eventually resulted in the objections. So in fact the decision on the 
Maasvlakte II was widened to achieve a win-win situation in the conflict economy-environment but at the 
same time give the start to a new game in which environment has to be weighted against fishery and 
farmer interests. This new game also activates new and other networks, which had not been present 




In this paper we have explored two round of a complex decision-making in spatial projects and their 
outcomes. At first we have tried to identify the complexity in the policy process. We did this by using 
concepts from network theory (actors, arenas and interactions). After that we tried to identify factors that 
contribute to potential successful outcomes of the complex decision-making game. From these exercise 
we can draw some interesting conclusions. 
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1.  Complexity in policy games is (partly) caused by the expansion of a policy game. 
As we have seen in the policy game around the Second Maasvlakte, the game is composed of different 
actors and arenas. The decision-making expands from the first round to the second round and shrinks 
again in the fourth round. This analysis by means of games and arenas allows us to picture the complexity 
of decision-making, and gives us an image of who and what is connected in decision-making. 
 
2.  This expansion of the policy game is necessary to manage the complexity 
The size of projects like the Second Maasvlakte and the impact of the project on many actors, makes them 
complex when looked at the number of actors. Interestingly enough this complexity also allows for 
solutions, which cannot be achieved without the complexity. Because the problems and the value conflicts 
that are tied to them themselves are complex only the involvement of many actors and resources makes a 
satisfactory solution possible. As we see from the PMR round this is far from an easy job. The conflicts 
between actors and their values is a constant tension in the process which has to be managed very 
carefully and takes a lot of time and energy 
 
3.  The interaction process cannot guarantee successful outcomes 
The interactive character of the policy game, made the policy process of a relative smooth character. As 
Weggeman indicates the Maasvlakte II is a good example of a typical Dutch interactive decision-making 
model (Weggeman 2003). As a Dutch politician remarked; 
The interactive decision-making around the Second Maasvlakte clearly illustrates that interactions can 
result in quality, commitment and speed.(Feenstra from Weggeman, 2003). 
 
In this respect the rejection of the zoning procedure of the Council of State seemed to be a complete 
surprise. But we saw that this rejection is connected to actors who are not intensively connected to the 
decision-making. In that sense afterwards the management did show some flaws.  
 
4.  How to come to successful outcomes  
Of course it remains a hard job to satisfy every actor. So good management does not guarantee a good 
outcome but no management efforts likely will result in bad outcomes or stalemates. And good 
management can achieve better solutions which have more support and that certainly enhances the 
chances that the solution will be adopted. But the complex character of decision-making cannot be 
‘tamed’ complete 
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Important for the managerial effort is as we saw in the case at first strategic management in the policy 
game. The ONR, BOM, VERM and Top Council were examples of arrangement with interactive powers 
that were intensively managed. Besides this an interesting content of the project seems to be crucial for 
the interaction process. The possibility to change the contents during the process (enrichment) and by that 
way to interest and satisfy various actors is important..  
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